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PEoPlE v. GuaRdIno: eXaMiNeD oN aPPeaL iN PEoPlE v. HEckER
The very idea of a jury is a body . . . composed of the peers or equals of the 
person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his 
neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in 
society as that which he holds.1
 Trial by jury is a fundamental right—one that is enshrined in the U.S. 
Constitution.2 The Sixth Amendment requires that a jury be “impartial.”3 However, 
during jury selection, parties may exclude jurors they consider undesirable by 
exercising a limited number of peremptory challenges.4 Lawyers need not offer a 
reason for excluding a juror unless the opposing party makes a prima facie case that 
the challenge was used to discriminate against that juror on the basis of race, 
ethnicity, or sex.5 Although peremptory challenges provide lawyers with discretion 
in selecting a jury, lawyers have abused their discretion to challenge by excluding 
women and minorities from jury participation.6 Such abuse has become a widespread 
problem in the U.S. criminal justice system.7 The system is intended to be fair and 
unbiased; yet the use of peremptory challenges, an integral element of trial procedure, 
can lead to abuse and injustice.
 In People v. Guardino, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New 
York, First Department, addressed whether the prosecution peremptorily challenged 
a group of African American female jurors for discriminatory reasons.8 On appeal in 
People v. Hecker, the New York Court of Appeals (“Court of Appeals”) was asked 
whether a party opposing a peremptory challenge may rely solely on the existence of 
numerical evidence to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination.9 Applying 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Batson v. Kentucky three-prong test,10 the Court of Appeals 
1. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
2. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
3. Id. amend. VI.
4. Hiroshi Fukurai & Richard Krooth, Race in the Jury Box: Affirmative Action in Jury 
Selection 136 (2003). In New York, each party is allowed the following numbers of peremptory 
challenges:
(a) Twenty for the regular jurors if the highest crime charged is a class A felony, and 
two for each alternate juror to be selected; (b) Fifteen for the regular jurors if the highest 
crime charged is a class B or class C felony, and two for each alternate juror to be 
selected; (c) Ten for the regular jurors in all other cases, and two for each alternate juror 
to be selected.
 N.Y. Crim. Proc. § 270.25 (McKinney 2010).
5. See Note, Judging the Prosecution: Why Abolishing Peremptory Challenges Limits the Dangers of Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2121, 2134–35 (2006).
6. See id. at 2123–24.
7. Id. at 2132.
8. 880 N.Y.S.2d 244, 246 (1st Dep’t 2009), aff ’d sub nom. People v. Hecker, 15 N.Y.3d 625 (2010).
9. 15 N.Y.3d at 644. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the case name changed from People v. Guardino 
to People v. Hecker.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 43.
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affirmed the First Department’s holding that the trial court properly denied 
Guardino’s Batson claim because the numerical evidence argument raised by Guardino 
was insufficient to demonstrate a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.11
 This case comment contends that the New York Court of Appeals construed the 
first prong of the Batson test too narrowly, muddled existing precedent, and made it 
increasingly more difficult to succeed on a Batson claim in New York. By holding 
that Guardino’s numerical evidence argument did not demonstrate proof of a prima 
facie case of discrimination under Batson’s first prong, the Court of Appeals has 
created an unreasonably high threshold for establishing a claim of jury 
discrimination.
 Defendant Anthony Guardino was the business manager for Local 8 of the 
United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers & Allied Workers (“Local 8”).12 The 
prosecution alleged that Guardino and eight co-defendants, including Local 8, 
extorted more than $2 million from roofing contractors through racketeering and 
mob inf luence.13 Though Local 8 and four other defendants entered guilty pleas, 
Guardino proceeded to trial.14
 A panel of twenty-six potential jurors was chosen at random for oral questioning.15 
At this first stage, twenty-five jurors were eliminated through peremptory challenges, 
leaving only one juror.16 A second panel of twenty-six potential jurors was then 
questioned.17 After the prosecution used peremptory challenges against four of six 
female African American potential jurors, Guardino raised a Batson claim.18 He 
argued that the prosecution’s peremptory challenges resulted in a nearly all-white 
jury.19 In total, thirty-seven prospective jurors, including twenty-five from the first 
round and twelve from the second round, were subject to peremptory challenges.20 
Of all the prospective jurors subjected to peremptory challenges on both panels, 
fifteen were male and twenty-two were female.21 The prosecution used twelve of its 
fifteen peremptory challenges and struck eleven of the twenty-two women.22 The 
record demonstrated that, of the prosecution’s twelve peremptory challenges, eleven 
11. Hecker, 15 N.Y.3d at 643–44; Guardino, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 246.
12. Guardino, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 246. 
13. Id.; see also Thomas L. Lueck, Roofing Union Charged With Scheme to Extort $2 Million, N.Y. Times, July 
28, 2004, at B3. Additionally, the prosecution alleged that some co-defendants were members of the 
Genovese crime family. Id.
14. Guardino, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 246.









PEoPlE v. GuaRdIno: eXaMiNeD oN aPPeaL iN PEoPlE v. HEckER
were made against women, with four of the eleven specifically dismissing African 
American women.23
 The trial court denied Guardino’s Batson claim on the basis that Guardino had 
not presented sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case and that he failed to 
present a pattern of the purposeful use of peremptory challenges against a 
“recognizable group.”24 Guardino’s trial proceeded with a jury comprised of seven 
men and five women.25 In assessing the final jury composition, defense counsel stated 
that “they bounced every African American female.”26 The final jury included only 
one “black female,” who was from the Republic of Suriname.27
 On December 12, 2006, the jury began deliberations and, on December 18, 
2006, they delivered a guilty verdict.28 Judgment was rendered on February 6, 2007, 
as amended on February 7, 2007, convicting Guardino of, inter alia, enterprise 
corruption and grand larceny in the third and fourth degrees.29
 On appeal, Guardino argued that the prosecution impermissibly used its 
peremptory challenges to remove a group of potential jurors due to the fact that they 
were African American women.30 To support the contention that the prosecution’s 
peremptory challenges were discriminatory, Guardino used the concept of 
intersectional status of race (here, African American) and gender (here, women).31 
Distinct from purposeful discrimination based on only race or only gender, purposeful 
intersectional discrimination targets a particular combination of the two protected 
23. Id.
24. People v. Guardino, 880 N.Y.S.2d 244, 248 (1st Dep’t 2009) (Catterson, J., dissenting), aff ’d sub nom. 
Hecker, 15 N.Y.3d 625. For purposes of determining whether jurors fall within a “recognizable group,” 
the U.S. Supreme Court, and subsequently New York courts, have held that “[t]he first step is to 
establish that the group is one that is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment 
under the laws, as written or as applied.” Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977). Additionally, 
the First Circuit has held:
[A] defendant must show that (1) the group is definable and limited by some clearly 
identifiable factor, (2) a common thread of attitudes, ideas or experiences runs through 
the group, and (3) a community of interests exists among the group’s members, such 
that the group’s interest cannot be adequately represented in the group is excluded from 
the jury selection process.
 Murchu v. United States, 926 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 1991).
25. Hecker, 15 N.Y.3d at 642.
26. Guardino, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 248 (Catterson, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 246.
29. Id. at 245.
30. Id. at 248 (Catterson, J., dissenting). 
31. Id. at 249. The question of whether the class of “African American” excludes an immigrant of African 
decent is one that was not addressed by the court. For an interesting discussion of race and peremptory 
challenges, see Kenneth B. Nunn, Rights Held Hostage: Race, Ideology and the Peremptory Challenge, 28 
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 63 (1993).
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classes.32 Guardino claimed that the jurors were not discriminated against based on 
either their sex or race alone, but rather based on their identity as African American 
women.33 Guardino argued that, because four out of six African American women 
were struck from the jury, the numerical evidence was sufficient to establish a prima 
facie case of discrimination under Batson.34 Guardino further argued that the trial 
court violated his equal protection rights by failing to request that the prosecution 
offer race-neutral reasons for its peremptory challenges under the second prong of 
the Batson test.35 Guardino offered no other evidence beyond such numerical evidence 
in support of his claim.36
 The prosecution argued that the defense failed to make a prima facie showing 
that the prosecution’s peremptory challenges were discriminatory.37 The prosecution 
additionally argued that the numerical evidence supplied by Guardino was unreliable 
because it was “purely statistical and based on an intersectional status (race and 
gender).”38
 The Batson claim framework used in Guardino stems from the landmark 1986 
U.S. Supreme Court decision of Batson v. Kentucky, in which the Court held that 
lawyers are prohibited from using peremptory challenges to dismiss potential jurors 
on the basis of race.39 As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Batson, individuals 
are now permitted to file Batson claims in order to question any peremptory challenges 
that they believe are discriminatory.40 The Court explained that such a prohibition is 
necessary for two reasons: (1) to protect individual defendants from a violation of 
their equal protection rights,41 and (2) to protect the right of U.S. citizens to 
participate in the judicial process as a juror without unlawful discrimination.42 The 
32. See Jean Montoya, “What’s So Magic[al] About Black Women?” + Peremptory Challenges at the Intersection of 
Race and Gender, 3 Mich. J. Gender & L. 369, 392 (1996).
33. Guardino, 880 N.Y.S. at 249.
34. Id. at 246.
35. See id. at 248–49 (Catterson, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 246–47 (majority opinion).
37. Id. at 249 (Catterson, J., dissenting).
38. Id.
39. 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (“[T]he State’s privilege to strike individual jurors through peremptory 
challenges[] is subject to the commands of the Equal Protection Clause. Although a prosecutor 
ordinarily is entitled to exercise permitted peremptory challenges . . . the Equal Protection Clause 
forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption 
that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State’s case against a black 
defendant.” (footnote omitted)).
40. See Anthony Page, Batson’s Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. 
Rev. 155, 158–59 (2005).
41. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86 (“Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant’s 
right to equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to 
secure.”).
42. Id. at 87 (“[B]y denying a person participation in jury service on account of his or her race, the state 
unconstitutionally discriminate[s] against the excluded juror.”).
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Batson court established a three-prong test that a party opposing a peremptory 
challenge must satisfy in order to succeed on such a claim.43 First, a party opposing a 
peremptory challenge as discriminatory must establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination, with consideration of all relevant circumstances.44 The Supreme 
Court specified, as an example, that a “‘pattern’ of strikes” against potential African 
American jurors would give rise to an inference of discrimination.45 The Supreme 
Court did not expound on what exactly constitutes a “pattern.” This has led many 
courts to use numerical evidence in their analyses.46 Next, the party who exercised 
the peremptory challenges at issue must offer race-neutral reasons to justify its 
challenges.47 After that party produces a race-neutral reason, the trial court must 
“decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial 
discrimination.”48
 The First Department affirmed Guardino’s conviction,49 holding that the 
numerical evidence was insufficient on its own, without other factual assertions or 
comparisons, to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.50 While conceding 
that “a purely numerical argument may give rise to a prima facie showing of 
discrimination,” the First Department nevertheless held that “numbers alone may 
not automatically establish such a showing.”51 To support its holding, the First 
43. Purkett v. Elm, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995).
44. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93–94.
45. Id. at 97.
46. Ramona L. Paetzold & Stephen L. Willborn, The Statistics of Discrimination, Using 
Statistical Evidence in Discrimination Cases § 11.04, at 20–21 & n.16 (1994); Brian J. Serr & 
Mark Maney, Criminal Law: Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the Democratic Jury: The Jurisprudence of 
a Delicate Balance, 79 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1, 27 (1988). However, Judge Arthur L. Burnett, Sr., 
described an early warning by the Batson dissent regarding the three-prong test and, specifically, 
regarding the difficulties in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, as follows:
Justice Thurgood Marshall, in his concurring opinion in Batson, . . . suggested that the 
three-step process enumerated by the Supreme Court could not ferret out all of the 
subtle ways clever lawyers could take race into consideration and yet give plausible 
explanations to defeat a claim of pretext. He first noted that defendants cannot attack 
the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges at all unless the challenges are so 
f lagrant as to establish a prima facie case. He concluded that this means that, in those 
states where only one or two black jurors survive the challenges for cause, the prosecutor 
need have no compunction about striking them from the jury because of their race. 
Simply put, there will not be sufficient numbers to establish a pattern or other factual 
basis for a prima facie case.
 Arthur L. Burnett, Sr., Abolish Peremptory Challenges, Reform Juries to Promote Impartiality, 20 Crim. 
Just. 26, 29 (2005) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 105).
47. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94.
48. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767.
49. People v. Guardino, 880 N.Y.S.2d. 244, 245 (1st Dep’t 2009), aff ’d sub nom. People v. Hecker, 15 
N.Y.3d 625 (2010).
50. Id. at 247 (citing People v. Brown, 743 N.Y.S.2d 347, 379 (2002)).
51. Id. at 246. 
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Department explained that Guardino failed to offer additional factors beyond 
numbers, such as factual assertions or comparisons, to establish that the prosecution 
peremptorily challenged jurors for impermissible purposes.52 Rather than specifically 
addressing the pattern-of-strikes argument referenced by Guardino, the First 
Department explained that the court had “considered defendant’s remaining 
arguments” but found them “unavailing.”53 The First Department held that, because 
Guardino failed to provide other factors beyond the numerical argument presented, 
he failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.54
 Justice Catterson, in his dissent, argued that Guardino had sufficiently made a 
prima facie showing of discrimination.55 He explained that the prosecution’s “pattern 
of strikes” against four out of the six African American females was, in and of itself, 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and thus satisfied the first 
prong of the Batson test.56 Justice Catterson reasoned that the class of African 
American women was sufficient because “the intersectional status at issue here should 
be treated the same way race and gender are treated under equal protection analysis.”57 
After concluding that Guardino established a prima facie case of jury discrimination 
based solely on numerical evidence alone, the dissent explained that the matter should 
be remitted to the trial court in order for the prosecution to complete the second 
prong of the Batson analysis by presenting race-neutral reasons for its challenges.58
 On November 30, 2010, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the First 
Department’s decision in People v. Hecker, holding that “the numerical arguments 
alone advanced by Guardino did not give rise to a prima facie case of impermissible 
discrimination.”59 The court reasoned that, because the facts lacked a “wholesale 
exclusion” of all African American women on either jury panel,60 Guardino was 
required to adduce “other factors” in order to make a prima facie claim of jury 
discrimination.61 The court juxtaposed two companion cases to demonstrate the 
52. Id. at 247.
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 249 (Catterson, J., dissenting). In explaining why the intersectional status argument was, in fact, 
preserved for review, Justice Catterson explained that “the spirit of Batson and its progeny requires this 
Court to recognize peremptory challenges exercised against individuals because of both their race and 
their sex.” Id. at 250. Furthermore, Justice Catterson argued that, with respect to establishing a pattern-
of-strikes argument, “[i]t is well-settled that numerical evidence of discrimination is sufficient to raise a 
prima facie case under Batson.” Id.
56. Id. at 250. 
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 15 N.Y.3d 625, 654 (2010). 
60. Id. at 653.
61. Id. at 653–54 (“In cases where we have sustained a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination 
absent a 100% exclusion rate of a cognizable group, the moving party has placed other factors on the 
record to meet the step one burden.”).
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application of the “other factors” requirement.62 Looking first to People v. Bolling, the 
court noted that “the defendant not only highlighted this statistical argument to the 
trial court, but augmented his showing by noting that two of the four excluded jurors 
had pro-prosecution tendencies with ‘ties to law enforcement.’”63 Second, the court 
cited People v. Steele, in which the court found that the defendant’s numerical evidence 
of jury discrimination—specifically, that 75% of the prosecution’s peremptory 
challenges were used to eliminate 50% of the potential African American jurors—
was insufficient by itself to meet the first prong.64 The court added that an additional 
factor to consider “is whether a defendant is a member of the same cognizable group 
the People are aiming to exclude.”65
 Legal precedent established by both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Court of 
Appeals clearly demonstrates that a numerical argument can establish a “pattern of 
strikes” against a recognized group, and may generally be sufficient to meet the first 
prong of the Batson test—despite the absence of a wholesale exclusion.66 Following 
this precedent, the Court of Appeals should have ruled that Guardino’s numerical 
evidence argument was sufficient to meet the first prong of the Batson test, without 
requiring the demonstration of additional evidence. Through People v. Hecker, the 
Court of Appeals has created an unreasonably high threshold for establishing a 
discrimination claim based on peremptory challenges under Batson, a result not 
compatible with Supreme Court precedent and contrary to prior Court of Appeals 
decisions.
 The first Batson prong requires a prima facie showing of discrimination in a 
party’s use of peremptory challenges.67 In Batson, the Supreme Court held that the 
challenging party must first prove the objective fact that the dismissed juror is a 
member of a cognizable racial group.68 Additionally, the challenging party must 
show that the combination of all the relevant facts and circumstances raises an 
inference that discrimination has occurred.69
62. Id.
63. Id. at 654 (quoting People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317, 322 (1992)).
64. Id. (citing Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d at 325).
65. Id. (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991)).
66. See, e.g., People v. Hawthorne, 80 N.Y.2d 873, 874 (1992) (holding that the peremptory challenge of 
four of the six African American members was sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of 
discrimination); People v. Jenkins, 75 N.Y.2d 550, 556 (1990) (explaining that a “pattern of strikes” was 
established when seven of ten peremptory challenges were used against blacks); see also Johnson v. 
California, 545 U.S. 162, 169 n.5 (2005) (explaining that a defendant may satisfy his prima facie burden 
by relying on the specific facts of a case as opposed to requiring a showing of pattern and practice of 
discrimination); People v. Rosado, 846 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1st Dep’t 2007) (holding that a numerical 
argument was sufficient, without any other evidence, to raise an inference of discrimination).
67. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93–94 (1986).
68. Id. at 96.
69. Id.
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 In establishing this rule, the Supreme Court implied the need for a broad 
interpretation of the prima facie test for jury discrimination. For example, in Georgia 
v. McCollum, the Supreme Court explained: “The Batson Court held that a defendant 
may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit 
jury based solely on the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges at the 
defendant’s trial.”70 Furthermore, a “‘pattern’ of strikes against black jurors included 
in the particular venire might give rise to an inference of discrimination.”71 In 1994, 
the Supreme Court in J.E.B. v. Alabama continued to broadly apply the Batson test 
by extending Batson to cover gender as well as race.72 In Powers v. Ohio, a white 
defendant was charged with murder and brought a Batson claim, arguing that the 
prosecution used its peremptory challenges to remove blacks from the jury.73 The 
Court held that, regardless of race, “[b]oth the excluded juror and the criminal 
defendant have a common interest in eliminating racial discrimination from the 
courtroom. . . . This congruence of interests makes it necessary and appropriate for 
the defendant to raise the rights of the juror.”74 Thus, the Supreme Court made clear 
that a criminal defendant can raise a peremptory challenge regardless of whether the 
defendant and the excluded juror share the same race.75
 In recent cases, the Supreme Court reiterated the need to broadly define the first 
prong of the Batson test. In Johnson v. California, the Court clarified:
[W]e assumed in Batson that the trial judge would have the benefit of all 
relevant circumstances, including the prosecutor’s explanation, before deciding 
whether it was more likely than not that the challenge was improperly 
motivated. We did not intend the first step to be so onerous that a defendant 
would have to persuade the judge—on the basis of all the facts, some of which 
are impossible for the defendant to know with certainty—that the challenge 
was more likely than not the product of purposeful discrimination. Instead, a 
defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first step by producing 
evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that 
discrimination has occurred.76
70. 505 U.S. 42, 47 (1992) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 87).
71. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. However, the Batson Court did not resolve the question of how many strikes are 
needed to demonstrate a “pattern,” and courts have been inconsistent in their analysis. See supra note 66.
72. 511 U.S. 127, 140–41 (1994) (“In recent cases we have emphasized that individual jurors themselves 
have a right to nondiscriminatory jury selection procedures. . . . [T]his right extends to both men and 
women.”).
73. 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991).
74. Id. at 413–14.
75. Id. at 402 (“[W]e hold that a criminal defendant may object to race-based exclusions of jurors effected 
through peremptory challenges whether or not the defendant and the excluded juror share the same 
races.”).
76. 545 U.S. 162, 170 (2005).
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Thus, the Supreme Court has made clear that this first prong should remain broadly 
construed.77
 The Court of Appeals has similarly provided a broad interpretation for establishing 
a prima facie case for discrimination in the State of New York. Most recently, in 
People v. Smocum, the defendant raised a Batson claim after one Hispanic and two 
African American women were peremptorily challenged.78 The court explicitly stated 
that, “[a]lthough as part of their prima facie case parties often rely on numbers to 
show a pattern of strikes against a particular group of jurors, a prima facie case may 
be made based on the peremptory challenge of a single juror that gives rise to an 
inference of discrimination.”79 Similarly, in People v. Childress, the Court of Appeals 
clarified that the first prong of the Batson test “may be established by a showing that 
members of the cognizable group were excluded while others with the same relevant 
characteristics were not.”80 Finally, the Court of Appeals warned that courts “should 
also take into consideration the fact that the mere existence of a system of peremptory 
challenges may serve as a vehicle for discrimination by those with racially motivated 
inclinations.”81
 Prior to Hecker, New York case law clearly established that a numerical argument 
on its own could establish a “pattern of strikes,” and thus a prima facie case of 
discrimination under the first prong of the Batson test. In People v. Hawthorne, the 
Court of Appeals held that the defendant made a prima facie showing of racial 
discrimination when the prosecutor challenged four out of six African American 
potential jurors.82 It did not require, nor even mention, the need for any additional 
evidence, finding the numerical evidence sufficient by itself.83
77. Indeed, some jurisdictions are now using a “bright-line rule” to establish a prima facie case of jury 
discrimination. James R. Gadwood, Note, The Framework Comes Crumbling Down: Juryquest in a Batson 
World, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 291, 299 (2008). The Supreme Court of South Carolina, for example, has held 
that simply raising a Batson challenge is sufficient to establish the first prong of the Batson test. Id.
78. 99 N.Y.2d 418, 221–22 (2003) (holding that the trial court should have decided whether the defense 
met the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under Batson).
79. 99 N.Y.2d at 221–22; see also People v. Brown, 97 N.Y.2d 500, 515–16 (2002).
80. 81 N.Y.2d 263, 267 (1993) (citing People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317, 324 (1992)). The Childress court held 
that the defense counsel failed to “articulate a sound factual basis for his claim during the Batson 
colloquy. His perfunctory statements in support of the defense motion for Batson relief plainly did not 
establish the existence of facts . . . sufficient to raise an inference that the prosecutor had used his 
peremptory challenges to exclude individuals because of their race.” Id. at 268.
81. Id. at 267 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986)). Additionally, the Court of Appeals has 
also cautioned against the use of peremptory challenges more generally. In her concurrence to People v. 
Brown, former Chief Judge Kaye stated that “[t]his Court stands as one in its recognition of the prized 
right of Americans to serve on juries, in its denunciation of invidious discrimination in jury selection 
and in its commitment to apply the law to assure that objective.” Brown, 97 N.Y.2d at 508. She added, 
“My nearly 16-year experience with Batson persuades me that, if peremptories are not entirely eliminated 
(as many have urged), they should be very significantly reduced.” Id. at 509.
82. 80 N.Y.2d 873, 874 (1992).
83. Id.; see also People v. Allen, 86 N.Y.2d 101, 109 (1995) (explaining that the defendant met his burden 
“when he protested the prosecutor’s use of 14 peremptory challenges” used against men).
1167
nEW yOrK LaW sChOOL LaW rEViEW VOLUME 55 | 2010/11
 In Hecker, the Court of Appeals ignored well-established precedent and created 
an unreasonably high threshold for establishing claims of jury discrimination through 
its narrow application of the first prong of the Batson test.84 Here, the numerical 
evidence revealed that, of the twelve peremptory challenges made by the prosecution, 
eleven challenges were made against women, four of which were made against 
African American women.85 This evidence alone demonstrates the existence of a 
“pattern of strikes” as explained in Batson and in subsequent New York cases such as 
Smocum.86 However, neither the Court of Appeals in Hecker nor the First Department 
majority opinions in Guardino even mention the existence of this well-established 
pattern-of-strikes analysis.87
 The argument offered by the Court of Appeals—that only wholesale exclusion 
of a class will allow a defendant to allege juror discrimination on the basis of statistical 
evidence alone—goes against Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has 
held that, to the contrary, a statistical disparity less than wholesale exclusion can 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Batson without additional 
evidence. In Meller-El v. Cockrell, the Court reversed a state court’s holding that 
statistical evidence did not support a prima facie case of jury discrimination when ten 
of the prosecution’s fourteen peremptory challenges were used against African 
Americans, leaving only one African American on the jury.88 The Court explained:
In this case, the statistical evidence alone raises some debate as to whether the 
prosecution acted with a race-based reason when striking prospective jurors. 
The prosecutors used their peremptory strikes to exclude 91% of the eligible 
African-American venire members, and only one served on petitioner’s jury. 
In total, 10 of the prosecutors’ 14 peremptory strikes were used against 
African-Americans. Happenstance is unlikely to produce this disparity.89
The Court, quoting Batson, explained that “[i]f these general assertions were accepted 
as rebutting a defendant’s prima facie case, the Equal Protection Clause would be but 
a vain and illusory requirement.”90
 It is difficult to reconcile this Supreme Court precedent with the Court of 
Appeals’ reasoning in Hecker. Not only is it clear that the Hecker court’s distinction 
between cases of wholesale exclusion and those of partial exclusion is erroneous, but 
the facts of Hecker support the argument that the prosecution’s use of peremptory 
84. See supra notes 59–65 and accompanying text.
85. People v. Hecker, 15 N.Y.3d 625, 642 (2010).
86. People v. Smocum, 99 N.Y.2d 418, 419 (2003).
87. See Hecker, 15 N.Y.3d 625; People v. Guardino, 880 N.Y.S.2d 244 (1st Dep’t 2009), aff ’d sub nom. Hecker, 
15 N.Y.3d 625. In fact, the only mention of the pattern-of-strikes test in the First Department’s opinion 
arises in the dissent. See Guardino, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 250 (Catterson, J., dissenting) (“I agree with the 
defendant that a ‘pattern of strikes’ against black females was established prima facie. It is well-settled 
that numerical evidence of discrimination is sufficient to raise a prima facie case under Batson.”).
88. 537 U.S. 322, 342–43, 347 (2003).
89. Id. at 342.
90. Id. at 347 (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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challenges against women, and African American women in particular, was similarly 
not due to “happenstance,” 91 and thus could be sufficient to establish a prima facie 
case for jury discrimination.
 Furthering this point, some circuits have construed the first prong of the Batson 
test expansively, as instructed by the Supreme Court.92 The Eleventh Circuit has 
held, “under Batson, the striking of one black juror for a racial reason violates the 
Equal Protection Clause, even where other black jurors are seated, and even when 
valid reasons for the striking of some black jurors are shown.”93 Similarly, the Sixth 
Circuit has held that “[s]ubstantial underrepresentation, as a result of purposeful 
discrimination, is as much a constitutional violation as total exclusion.”94
 The Court of Appeals also erred by basing part of its reasoning on the fact that 
Guardino, a white male defendant, was not of the same “cognizable group” as the 
stricken jurors. In direct contrast to the words of caution used by the Supreme Court 
in Powers v. Ohio, the Court of Appeals reasoned that an additional factor to consider 
when determining whether a party has asserted a prima facie claim of discrimination 
is “whether a defendant is a member of the same cognizable group the People are 
aiming to exclude.”95 The court wrongly cited Supreme Court precedent by claiming 
that “the Supreme Court, nevertheless, emphasized that [whether defendant is of the 
same cognizable class as those who suffered jury discrimination] remains a factor in 
evaluating whether the totality of the circumstances gives rise to a showing of 
purposeful discrimination” by citing to Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Powers.96
 The Supreme Court stated in Powers that the “[r]acial identity between the 
defendant and the excused person might in some cases be the explanation for the 
prosecution’s adoption of the forbidden stereotype,” but then cautioned, “to say that 
the race of the defendant may be relevant to discerning bias in some cases does not 
91. Id. at 342.
92. See, e.g., Jordan v. Lefevre, 206 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[T]he judge declared it was not then 
necessary that the prosecutor provide a race neutral basis for his challenges, but asked him to provide one 
in order to save time.”); United States v. Scott, 26 F.3d 1458, 1465 (8th Cir. 1994) (explaining how the 
district court required the government to justify its use of peremptory strikes “without expressly finding 
that [the defendant] had made a prima facie showing that the government had exercised its peremptory 
strikes on the basis of race”); United States v. Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102, 1108 (10th Cir. 1991) (“Because 
the Government offered a race-neutral explanation for its peremptory challenge of the two black jurors, 
and because the trial court ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary 
issue of whether Defendant actually made a prima facie showing of discrimination is now moot.”); State 
v. Spivey, 874 So. 2d 352, 361 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (observing that, although a party need not give an 
explanation for its use of a peremptory challenge if the trial court has not found that the movant has 
made a prima facie case, “many trial courts require [an explanation] to create a complete record”).
93. United States v. David, 803 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th. Cir. 1986); see also Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 
478 (2008) (“Because we find that the trial court committed clear error in overruling petitioner’s Batson 
objection with respect to [one juror], we have no need to consider petitioner’s claim regarding [a second 
juror].”). 
94. Abdul v. Lane, 588 F.2d 1178, 1179 (1978) (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 493 (1977)).
95. People v. Hecker, 15 N.Y.3d 625, 652 (2010) (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991)). 
96. Id. (citing Powers, 499 U.S. at 429 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
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mean that it will be a factor in others, for race prejudice stems from various causes 
and may manifest itself in different forms.”97 By this formulation, the Supreme Court 
intended that race only become a factor to assist a defendant in proving discrimination, 
not to be a factor for the prosecution to disprove discrimination. This is made clear 
through the Supreme Court’s consistently broad interpretation of Batson and the 
underlying purposes of those decisions: Batson claims, at their foundational root, are 
meant to ferret out discrimination in jury selection for the protection of both the 
defendant and potential juror, not to hide discrimination under meaningless 
distinctions between the defendant and the juror discriminated against.98
 The Court of Appeals should have reached the same conclusion as it reached in 
People v. Hawthorne.99 In both cases, the prosecution challenged four out of six 
potential jurors of a particular class.100 This numerical evidence should have been 
found sufficient in Hecker, as it was in Hawthorne, to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination under Batson’s first prong, “even though it was not accompanied by 
any other evidence.”101
 Guardino could have also argued that the prosecution’s use of peremptory 
challenges against women was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination. Ten out of the eleven prosecutorial peremptory challenges were 
against women— over ninety percent of the challenges made by the prosecution.102 
Analogously, in J.E.B. v. Alabama, the Supreme Court found that the defendant 
sufficiently established a prima facie case of discrimination after demonstrating that 
nine out of the ten peremptory challenges by the prosecution were used to strike 
men.103 While it might be argued that the presence of five women on the jury in 
Guardino’s case limits this argument, the resulting jury make-up is no excuse for 
challenges made with a discriminatory motive.104
97. Powers, 499 U.S. at 416.
98. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87–90 (1986). “Racial discrimination in selection of jurors harms not 
only the accused whose life or liberty they are summoned to try. Competence to serve as a juror 
ultimately depends on an assessment of individual qualifications and ability impartially to consider 
evidence presented at a trial.” Id. at 87.
99. 80 N.Y.2d 873, 874 (1992).
100. Compare id. (“[T]he prosecutor peremptorily challenged four of the six African American members of 
the venire.”), with People v. Guardino, 880 N.Y.S.2d 244, 246 (1st Dep’t 2009) (“Of the six black 
women in question, four were peremptorily challenged by the People . . . .”), aff ’d sub nom. Hecker, 15 
N.Y.3d 625.
101. People v. Rosado, 846 N.Y.S.2d 165, 166 (1st Dep’t 2007).
102. Guardino, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 251 (Catterson, J., dissenting).
103. 511 U.S. 127, 129–31 (1994).
104. See, e.g., People v. Jenkins, 75 N.Y.2d 550, 557 (1990) (“A Batson violation is not avoided, however, simply 
because notwithstanding the discriminatory use of peremptory strikes, the prosecutor leaves some blacks 
on the jury panel and those left are enough to form a petit jury containing a percentage of blacks not 
significantly lower than the percentage of blacks in the local community.”); cf. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 
400, 402 (1991) (holding that peremptory challenges based solely on race are unconstitutional regardless 
of whether the excluded jurors are or are not of the same race as the defendant).
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 Though it has been said that the first prong of the Batson test is a fairly easy 
standard to meet,105 the Court of Appeals’ holding has improperly heightened the 
standard. As the Supreme Court itself warned in Johnson, the first prong of the 
Batson test should not be so onerous as to make the defendant prove that it is more 
likely than not that there was discrimination.106 Regardless of whether Guardino’s 
Batson claim would have ultimately succeeded, the Court of Appeals failed to grant 
such an opportunity. In effect, the Court of Appeals held that numbers are simply 
not enough without complete exclusion of a protected class from the jury, and that a 
party in such a situation must search for factors beyond numbers to identify an 
impermissible discriminatory motive.107 Further, if New York continues to follow the 
holding in Hecker, otherwise valid Batson claims will be less likely to succeed if 
defendants are not of the same race and sex as the jurors being discriminated against. 
Not only does this go beyond the required “pattern of strikes” analysis established by 
the U.S. Supreme Court, but it also makes it increasingly more difficult to succeed 
on a Batson claim in New York.
 Some studies suggest that African Americans receive a statistically lower rate of 
protection under Batson than that of other classes of individuals, including whites.108 
A study by Kenneth J. Melilli regarding peremptory challenges revealed that, from 
1986 to 1993, African Americans were the targets in Batson claims 87% of the time, 
whereas whites were the targets in only 1% of Batson claims.109 During this period, 
African American defendants “succeeded in only 17% of their claims, while white 
[defendants] succeeded in 53% of their claims.”110 Such discrimination is problematic 
because it fails to promote diversity on the jury.111 Diversity of race, ethnicity, and sex 
in the jury selection system is necessary to create a racially equitable and diverse 
tribunal necessary to render fair and legitimate jury verdicts.112 Perhaps more 
significantly, as the Supreme Court acknowledged in Batson, “[p]urposeful racial 
discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant’s right to equal protection 
because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure.”113 In 
light of such statistics, it is all the more important for defendants to be able to raise 
Batson claims on behalf of themselves and jurors discriminated against, which in 
105. See Note, supra note 5, at 2134.
106. Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 165, 170 (2005).
107. See People v. Hecker, 15 N.Y.3d 625, 653–54 (2010); Fukurai & Krooth, supra note 4, at 136.
108. Note, supra note 5, at 2135.
109. See id. (citing Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory 
Challenges, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 447, 462 tbl.E-1 (1996)).
110. Id. (citing Melilli, supra note 109, at 463 tbl.E-2).
111. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 87–88; see also Melilli, supra note 109, at 500 (“The value of the jury largely 
depends upon the representation of various group beliefs, which itself diminishes the impact of any 
unfair biases.”).
112. See Note, supra note 5, at 2142; see also Fukurai & Krooth, supra note 4, at 17.
113. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86.
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turn makes the Hecker court’s higher standard for the first Batson prong even more 
detrimental to the rights of defendants.
 Thus, in establishing that Guardino’s particular numerical argument was 
insufficient, the Court of Appeals has made it more difficult to establish the first 
prong of the Batson test. In doing so, the Court of Appeals ignored Supreme Court 
precedent and seemingly reversed some of its own. Both courts have consistently held 
in favor of a lower evidentiary standard to establish the first prong of the Batson 
test.114 Thus, the Court of Appeals should have construed this test more broadly and 
held that the numerical evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination despite the lack of complete exclusion or additional evidence of 
discrimination. If numerical evidence is insufficient on its own, then the ability of a 
defendant to succeed in proving jury discrimination in a New York State court is 
significantly reduced. Such difficulty in establishing a jury discrimination claim 
hinders the ability of defendants to obtain a fair trial with a representative jury of 
their peers.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 66–80.
